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  This Policy Brief emphasizes the necessity for Turkey to normalize its relations with the Regional 
Administration in Northern Iraq in order to “eliminate” PKK. Despite the numerous and intense 
military operations by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) towards domestic and/or cross-border 
targets, PKK still preserves its operational capacity. The study does not touch upon the other factors 
that necessitate the normalization of relations with the Regional Administration but it contends that 
the Regional Administration will play a critical role for the resolution of the problem.  
  Turkey’s most important problem is the 
Kurdish problem, and it coincides with the 
dissolution of the PKK. What is meant here 
by dissolution is the disarmament of the    
organization. Viewing the PKK as an        
outcome of the Kurdish problem, the author 
-while cautious to stay objective- formulates 
the role to be played by the Kurdistan       
Regional Government (KRG) in bringing the 
organization’s activities in northern Iraq to 
an end, and enumerates some                       
recommendations. The article consists of 
four sections; “Defining the Problem”, 
“Historical Evolution”, “The Situation       
Today”, and “Suggestions for a Resolution”. 
1 – Defining the Problem 
  For 25 years, the Republic of Turkey has 
been faced with the PKK and its violent 
politics. The armed organization, which   
initially emerged as a guerilla movement 
with limited caliber, has by now morphed 
into a political entity resting on a grassroots 
mass base that is spread across Turkey, 
European countries, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Iran, Syria, and    
Northern Iraq. Today the issue Turkey is 
faced with is the elimination of this          
organization, whose birth and evolution is 
a consequence of the denial of a Kurdish 
problem almost to this day, which itself is a 
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result of the main paradigm of Turkey’s 
“republic” system. Due to the “cause and 
effect” relationship between the Kurdish 
problem and the PKK, as well as to the     
present conditions, the disarmament process 
of the organization proves to be parallel to 
the solving of the Kurdish problem. 
 
2 – Historical Evolution 
  The 85-year young history of the Turkish 
Republic could be read as a history of civil 
war. The manner in which Kurdish             
uprisings were suppressed starting with the 
Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, as well as the 
state’s almost retributive investment and   
administrative policies in the region during 
the periods of non-violence, combined with 
the denial of the Kurdish population’s       
existence prepared the base on which the 
PKK would flourish. The continuum of 
Kurdish uprisings began to exhibit an     
ideological, political and organizational 
unity with the attacks on the Eruh and    
Şemdinli provinces by the PKK after a long 
interval on August 15, 1984. 
  The PKK, which in early 1990s aimed to   
establish an independent state in the        
predominantly Kurdish regions of Eastern 
and Southeastern Anatolia, was forced to 
seek negotiations with the Turkish Republic 
especially after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and to this end unilaterally declared 
ceasefire a number of times. Following the 
handing in of its founding leader Abdullah 
Öcalan to Turkey in 1999, the PKK moved 
all of its forces beyond Turkey’s borders on 
his orders. Modifying its military strategy 
and switching from armed struggle as a  
fundamental policy to a defensive position, 
the organization focused on the process of 
politicization. 
  Giving up the goal of independence as 
well, the PKK adopted the “Democratic con-
federacy” and “Democratic sovereignty” 
programs formulated by Öcalan in 2005. 
With this the aim was self-governance and 
realization of their ethnic identity by the 
Kurds within a structure of local                 
administrations, while maintaining the 
state’s unitary character. 
  After spending the period from 1999 to 
2005 in a unilateral ceasefire, the PKK 
switched back to armed struggle on the 
grounds that Ankara did not take any steps 
towards solving the Kurdish problem. 
  In order to eradicate the threat posed by 
the PKK, whose preferred tactic for        
eliminating security forces was to use        
remote-controlled mines, Turkey formed an 
international alliance in the fall of 2007 with 
the aim of ending the organization’s          
existence in Northern Iraq. Especially the 
United States (US), but also Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and to a certain extent the European Union 
and the KRG in Northern Iraq lent their   
support. The meeting between Prime       
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US 
President George W. Bush on November 7th 
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2007 provided the critical point in this        
alliance. One of the outcomes of the meeting 
was that the US would provide Turkey with 
instant intelligence. Adding this advantage 
to their own means, the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) carried out intense airborne 
operations against PKK targets in Northern 
Iraq beginning on December 16th 2007.      
Between 21st and 29th of February in 2008, a 
ground incursion took place in the Zap      
region, where PKK’s main base was located. 
Throughout the spring, summer and fall of 
that year, military pressure was kept on 
PKK targets both within and outside the 
country. 
  During this process and in coordination 
with the TAF, Iran kept shelling the Kandil 
region as well.  
  The KRG, on the other hand, kept its        
silence at the military operations in       
Northern Iraq with the exception of the 
ground incursion, while maintaining a “pro 
dialogue and peaceful resolution” attitude 
and not putting much pressure on the PKK. 
 
3 – The Situation Today 
  Despite the TAF’s intense operations on 
targets both within and outside the country, 
the PKK maintained its central structure, 
chain of command, and operational            
capacity. While the Turkish General Staff 
stated in its assessment of 2008 that      
Northern Iraq is no longer a safe haven for 
the PKK, the fact that the organization was 
able to hold its vitally important “10th     
Congress” for a full week in August showed 
that airborne operations and the power of 
intelligence have their limits. 
  Since it is impossible to independently    
verify the completely contradictory claims 
made by the TAF and the PKK regarding the 
damage caused to one another, it could be 
assumed that with new recruitments, the   
organization has maintained its usual    
numbers of militants, which is estimated to 
be 3-4 thousand. 
  While the year long military campaign 
proved Turkey’s political will in the conflict, 
its effect on the PKK, which, having faced an 
entity much powerful than itself came 
through this period virtually intact, was that 
of increased self-confidence. The high-up 
officers of the organizations were able to 
closely follow the developments in Turkey 
and give frequent interviews and situation 
analyses to their own media channels. 
  Having identified 2009 as the year to set 
Öcalan free and solve the Kurdish problem, 
the organization’s attention is now directed 
at İmralı. In other words, 10 years spent in 
İmralı’s conditions has not taken away from 
Öcalan’s authority over the organization. 
Through the statements that come out from 
his weekly meetings with his lawyers, he is 
at times able to set the agenda in Turkey and 
provide his followers with political            
perspective. Öcalan’s agreeable attitude is 
striking; by now he has made numerous   
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offers in order to end the armed conflict and 
solve the Kurdish problem. 
  The organization thinks that unless it       
receives a heavy blow until local elections -
scheduled for March of 2009- are held, the 
process for the solution of the Kurdish    
problem will begin. Ankara, for its part, is 
continuing military pressure on the PKK on 
the one hand, while transferring prisoners to 
İmralı to relieve the tension that rose at the 
claim that Öcalan was mistreated there,     
establishing the Kurdish TRT 6 channel, and 
announcing the establishment of Kurdish 
Language and Literature departments in 
universities on the other, thereby employing 
the “carrots and sticks” strategy. 
 
4 – Suggestions for a Solution 
  While dubious in practical terms,             
considering that in theory the Kurdish prob-
lem will continue to exist even if the PKK’s 
military power is destroyed, it is vitally    
important to design a process that will result 
in the elimination of the organization. 
  In other words, a mediation effort that 
takes into account certain sensitivities is 
much needed between Ankara, which      
perceives steps towards the resolution of the 
problem while the PKK continues its       
military existence and attacks as 
“submission to terrorism” and the              
organization, which perceives giving up 
arms before the problem is solved as 
“surrendering.” 
  In present conditions, the KRG in Northern 
Iraq is the most suitable candidate to design 
and carry out this critical process to end the 
armed conflict. 
  That Öcalan has requested Jalal Talabani, 
the President of Iraq, to interfere for peace, is 
clear indication that the organization is 
ready for such mediation. 
  As for Ankara, allowing the KRG to         
become the “legitimate” authority to per-
form this function, it should: 
1. Refrain from pressuring Erbil to take a 
stance against PKK members in   
Northern Iraq 
2.      Suspend air and ground operations and 
bombardment in Northern Iraq 
3.      Elevate the relations with Northern 
Iraq to an “official” position by opening a 
consulate in Erbil and inviting Massoud   
Barzani to Ankara. 
   If these conditions are met, it will be      
possible for the KRG to materialize its plan 
towards disarmament while taking into    
account Turkey’s “state” and the PKK’s 
“organization” sensitivities. 
  The successful completion of this process 
will enable Turkey and the KRG to over-
come the mutual historic mistrust and for 
the parties to feel more powerful in an un-
stable Middle East. 
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